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Opening Address 
The Honorable Conrad Harper 
Professor Grunawalt's Introduction of the Honorable Mr. Conrad Harper 
Professor Grunawalt: We are very fortunate indeed to have with us this morning 
as our keynote speaker, Mr. Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State. If there is a testament to the importance of the work we 
are doing, it is that Mr. Harper has found the time to break away from the State 
Department to join us this morning. Mr. Harper, we are just absolutely delighted 
that you are, in fact, here and able to join us. 
Mr. Harper did his undergraduate work at Howard University and earned his 
law degree from Harvard. He was engaged in the private practice oflaw from 1971 
to 1993, with the New York City law firm of Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett. His 
specialization was in commercial litigation, but he did many other things along 
the way, for example, visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, consultant at the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and working many years in various 
capacities with the NAACP and it's Legal Defense and Education Fund. He is a 
member of various Councils, including the council of the American Law Institute, 
a Fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the Council 
of Foreign Relations, and a Trustee of the Nelson Cromwell Foundation. Mr. 
Harper assumed his duties in the Clinton Administration on the 24th of May, 
1993. 
I had occasion to meet Mr. Harper a little more than a year ago. I had been given 
the unenviable task of briefing Mr. Harper and his staff with respect to the 
Vincennes incident and the destruction ofIran AirBus Flight #655. At that time, 
Mr. Harper and his staff were preparing for the Iran AirBus case before the 
International Court of Justice. Now I had occasion any number of times to talk 
about the Vincennes, in the context of rules of engagement, to a variety of audiences, 
national and international. But, this was the first time I was subjected to cross 
examination and let me tell you, it was a very interesting evolution. But, I learned 
something from Mr. Harper at that time and I can attest certainly this morning 
that our speaker is indeed a quick study and an insightful, precise, and 
consummate lawyer and a great gentleman. Ladies and Gentlemen, I give you our 
keynote speaker, Mr. Conrad Harper. 
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The Honorable Mr. Conrad Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. State Department 
Mr. Harper: Thank you very much Professor Grunawalt for that more than 
pleasant introduction. It is always delightful to hear oneself described in such a 
way that applause would emanate at least from one's mother if not from anyone 
else. I am particularly pleased to be in this room because before we came in this 
morning for this session I went around the entire room and looked at the titles of 
the many volumes on the shelves that line these walls. Although it is an 
extraordinary collection in its own right, I know it is just the leavings, if you will, 
of a major library here at the War College. But nonetheless, it's an extraordinary 
group of volumes gathered over the last hundred years dealing with history and 
political science and warfare. And, many of them are in dust jackets of the 1890's 
and early 1900's. So to some of us who have a little touch of bibliomania, it was 
just extraordinary to see what has been placed here to grace this historic conference 
facility. I am grateful for this particular environment. 
I am particularly glad to be with our distinguished colleagues in the armed 
forces, government, the academy, and the sciences for what promises to be a most 
stimulating conference on the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict and other military operations. The knowledge and scholarship and 
experience that the group assembled here brings to the subject is impressive. And, 
I am grateful to Rear Admiral Stark and Dean Wood for the gracious invitation to 
take part in these proceedings. 
The U.S. Government has long taken a very serious interest in this subject. The 
Departments of State and Defense have, for some time now, participated actively 
in international discussions regarding protection of the environment during 
military operations. Consensus, as we all know, is not easy to forge, but I believe 
that our efforts in recent years have been productive, and have beneficially raised 
the profile of this issue in the international community. 
Since Rear Admiral LeGrand will soon follow me to frame the issues to be 
discussed in the coming days, I thought I might address in more selective fashion 
the events of the Gulf War, which in recent years, have tended to dominate 
discussions in this field. Specifically, I would like to share with you what lessons 
I am and am not inclined to draw from Iraq's wanton damage of the environment 
during the Gulf War, and the international community's response to Iraq's 
conduct. 
The facts are not in dispute. Iraqi forces deliberately exploded more than 700 
oil wells in occupied Kuwait, and released more than one million tons of crude oil 
into the Persian Gulf. We have yet to completely fathom the consequences of this 
massive, reckless poisoning of the environment. The Gulfs ecosystem has been 
disrupted for years to come, for as long as twenty years according to some experts. 
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The oil fires lighted by Iraqi forces produced a torrent of pollutants which cast a 
toxic pall over Kuwait and soiled the skies of other Gulf States as well. 
This tragedy fueled an already existing debate among lawyers, scientists, policy 
makers and military officials over the adequacy of the international legal regime 
which is intended to protect the environment from unjustified damage during 
times of armed conflict. 
On one side of the debate are those who believe that the legal regime requires 
substantive modification. Some suggest the need for the wholesale creation of new 
international instruments. Others advocate a range of smaller-scale changes which 
would ostensibly clarify and expand the reach and effect of existing laws. Among 
the changes suggested are expansion of the scope of Additional Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention 
(ENMOD). Additional Protocol I, to which the United States is not a party, 
prohibits the use of methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. 
Parties to the ENMOD Convention undertake not to use environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as a 
means of destruction or injury to another party. 
In addition to expanding the scope of Additional Protocol I and the ENMOD 
Convention, it has also been suggested that their terms be clarified and 
harmonized. It has been said that the terms "widespread, long-term and severe" on 
the one hand, and "widespread, long-lasting, or severe" on the other are vague and 
imprecise. 
Others have proposed modifying the proscription against destruction of 
property not justified by military necessity and the related principle of 
proportionality to include explicit references to environmental damage among the 
categories of damage to be weighed in the law of war calculus. It has been suggested 
that these legal principles are currently formulated in a way that tips the scales in 
the favor of military action at the expense of damage to the environment. 
The other side of this debate takes the view that the existing legal regime is 
substantively adequate and sufficiently protective. From this perspective, existing 
laws properly balance the need to protect the environment against the legitimate 
prerogative to engage in armed conflict under certain circumstances. It is the view 
of individuals in this camp that further development of the legal regime to protect 
the environment in times of armed conflict should focus on collective efforts to 
appreciate the not-insignificant scope and reach of existing laws, to disseminate 
and internalize these norms and to enforce them ,:igorously and remedy their 
violation. 
Interestingly, the events of environmental consequence that occurred during 
the Gulf War have been cited as instructive examples both by those who believe 
that substantive changes in the legal order are necessary and by those who do not. 
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I must say that I belong to the latter camp. In my view, the crying need to enforce 
current norms far outweighs the need to modify or expand the existing legal 
regime. We should distinguish between two distinct legal imperatives which 
inform this discussion: The imperative to establish and articulate rights where 
appropriate, and the imperative to enforce those rights and to remedy, when 
necessary, their violation. 
History suggests that lawmakers, whether judges or legislators, are 
understandably more inclined to embrace discussions of rights than to confront 
sticky, practical, and often times seemingly intractable questions embedded in 
issues of compliance and remedies. 
One of our challenges, I think, is to resist this inclination, for rights divorced 
from a commitment to enforce them and to remedy their violation are oflimited 
value. 
The question of rights and liabilities is, in fact, not even always at issue. That 
Iraq violated intemationallaw by setting fIre to oil platforms and dumping oil into 
the Gulf appears, in my view, beyond dispute. International law prohibits the 
destruction of property not justifIed by military necessity, prohibits military 
operations not directed against legitimate military targets, and prohibits military 
operations that cause incidental damage clearly excessive in relation to their direct 
military advantage. By any reasonable measure, Iraq's actions violated these 
proscriptions. Many observers have noted that the oil platform fIres were ignited 
at a point when the conflict was essentially concluded, and therefore, not even a 
pretense of military justifIcation existed for these Iraqi actions. 
Consequently, the environmental events of the Gulf War are principally a case 
study in the difficulties of fashioning remedies and giving meaning to those 
international legal norms that are intended to protect the environment. Let us 
then take a closer look at the reaction of the world community to Iraq's destruction 
of the environment and ask whether it is serious, whether it is sufficient, and what 
lessons it suggests for the future. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 asserted Iraq's liability under 
international law for all direct loss or damage stemming from its unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait. The Resolution makes particular reference to 
"environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources" as if to emphasize 
that these elements of damage are not to be overlooked, and are to be treated 
together with more traditional indicia of damage and injury to persons, their 
livelihood and their property. 
The precedential value of this Resolution should not be overlooked. It is, 
arguably, the fIrst time that the international community has formally recognized 
wartime environmental damage to be compensable. On the other hand, Resolution 
687 does not work any change in the law of war on environmental damage. And, 
it bears noting that underjus ad bellum, under international law relating to the use 
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of force, Iraq is liable for environmental and all other damage directly caused by 
its invasion whether or not it violated the law of war. 
In accordance with Resolution 687, the U.N. Compensation Commission was 
established to administer the claims process and to make payments to claimants 
from a fund that was to be capitalized through a 30% levy on Iraqi oil exports. 
Unfortunately, these oil exports have not resumed because of Iraq's failure to 
comply with applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions; as a result, the 
Compensation Fund's balance is currently only about ten million dollars, which 
has been contributed by the United States and other countries (mostly from frozen 
Iraqi assets) to begin the claims process. I should note, for the sake of comparison, 
that we are estimating that approximately 200 billion dollars in claims will be filed 
with the Compensation Commission before the process is concluded. 
The claims have been divided into subgroups and given priority on the basis 
of urgency. In December 1993, the first panel of the Compensation Commission 
began working on cases involving claims of death and serious personal injury. 
Other panels are giving priority attention to the claims of hundreds of thousands 
of foreign workers who were compelled to leave Iraq and Kuwait at great personal 
loss. Individual claims of less serious personal injury and property damage have 
followed, as have commercial claims. To date, the Commission has approved some 
355,000 individual awards, totaling approximately 1.4 billion dollars. 
Environmental claims will be considered at a later point in the process, and the 
Commission has set a February 1997 deadline for their submission. 
The reason for the long horizon for environmental claims is that it will take 
some time to assess accurately the long-term environmental consequences ofIraq's 
actions, and that until such assessments are concluded, effective, comprehensive 
consideration of environmental claims cannot occur. Of course, so long as the 
Compensation Commission's financial resources are not sufficient to cover the 
awards it issues, decisions will have to be made regarding the allocation of available 
funds, and the first priority will probably be to compensate individuals for direct 
personal loss rather than governments, which would likely be the principal 
claimants for environmental damage. 
Let me hasten to add that there are limitations in the Gulf War example which 
affect the extent to which it may be considered a paradigm. 
The Gulf War presents none of the shades of gray one would expect to find in 
a typical scenario implicating international legal protection for the environment 
during armed conflict. Iraq's actions reflect complete vindictiveness; unlike the 
typical case where there may be debate over the question of military necessity and 
justification, Iraq's conduct was, essentially, without any pretense of justification. 
The Gulf War example is also atypical in that the perpetrator of the 
environmental damage was militarily defeated and, save for the operation of 
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multilateral sanctions, has substantial resources that can be used to satisfy claims 
arising from its conduct. 
In short, the Gulf War example does not speak to the more difficult, more subtle 
cases where the intent of the party doing damage to the environment is less clear 
than it was in the case of Iraq. It is these cases that peculiarly challenge the 
international legal order: cases where the environment is not deliberately targeted 
for destruction; cases where environmental damage is incidental to achieving a 
military objective. 
Changes to the law, to the existing legal order, will not, in my view, make such 
hard cases any easier, because their difficulty ultimately inheres in the nature of 
their circumstances. To the extent that widespread agreement on new laws and 
standards could be reached, and I have my doubts, the resulting agreement might 
likely resemble a lowest common denominator, decidedly unhelpful in dealing 
with hard cases. 
Or, in order to garner consensus, a new agreement might well be a model of 
ambiguity, the value of which could also fairly be questioned. In this regard, I note 
the debate that has occurred in the wake of the Gulf War over whether Iraq's 
damage of the environment constituted "widespread, long-term and severe" 
damage in violation of Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I. Although Additional 
Protocol I has received considerable support in the international community, what 
exactly constitutes "widespread, long-term and severe damage" is a question that 
continues to perplex commentators and to defy shared understanding. One might 
therefore be wary of a process that could very well generate new rules, new 
standards whose meaning would remain fundamentally in doubt. 
In sum, I am unconvinced that new laws would help us answer difficult 
questions; the more likely outcome is that they would merely inspire continued 
debate on somewhat different terms. 
To this point I have made reference only to civil remedies. Criminal sanctions 
are, of course, another tool, a potentially powerful tool, to enforce international 
norms. Whether the international community will one day elect to bring to bear 
the force of criminal sanctions against those who perpetrate gross and unjustified 
environmental damage in warfare remains to be seen. In my view, we have not yet 
arrived at the point where the international community is willing to put its 
credibility, commitment, and the full force of its conscience behind prosecutions 
for environmental crimes in much the same way that it has demanded 
accountability in the context of Rwanda and Bosnia. The absence of the necessary 
consensus is to some extent reflected in the continuing international discussions, 
and disagreements, about the appropriate subject matter jurisdiction of a possible 
International Criminal Court. 
These are only a few of the issues to be addressed during our discussions which 
will no doubt e~rich our understanding of this important subject. More than that, 
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these discussions constitute an integral part of our commitment to enforce the 
norms governing the protection of the environment during military operations. 
Through the process of dissemination, by teaching what international law 
requires, the Naval War College is shaping the understanding of th~ men and 
women of the armed forces in whose hands the integrity of the environment rests 
during military operations as so graphically brought home by Rear Admiral Stark's 
comments this morning. 
Precautionary, ex ante efforts of this sort are crucial if we intend, as a practical 
matter, to protect the environment, and not simply debate liabilities, 
enforcement, and remedies after the fact. By engaging in discussions that may well 
help shape the legal regime, this institution ensures that the perspective of the 
armed forces and the realities of armed conflict are not lost or neglected in the 
process. Only through a commitment to dialogue, education, and consultation 
shall we succeed in building a reasoned measure of respect for the environment in 
the international community. 
And I thank you for this opportunity to share some of my thoughts. 
Professor Grunawalt: Mr.Harper has consented to respond to questions and I 
open up the floor to anybody who would like to begin. 
Colonel Charles Dunlap, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command: I would like 
to challenge your assumption that the way the Iraqi's waged war was clearly a 
violation of international law. How is a third world nation supposed to oppose a 
high-tech power that is a high-tech power because it has an industrial base that is 
dumping unbelievable amounts of pollutants into the air? In other words, isn't the 
use of smoke to defeat satellite systems and precision weaponry a legitimate way 
for a third world less-developed nation to resist a high-tech power? 
Mr. Harper: I am glad you asked the question. First of all, I do not agree with your 
premise. More to the point, ifIraq's actions are not condemnable, there is nothing 
worth talking about during this conference. I took Iraq as the clearest possible 
case. I appreciate that by fouling the air and fouling the water it could be argued 
that Iraq was simply engaged in opposing the Coalition arrayed against it. But, 
this was a means so horrific, so disproportionate, so outrageous, that no one has 
come forward, and I understand you not to be doing this, to justify what Iraq did. 
This was an act or series of acts of desperation virtually at the last moment; at a 
time when it could not reasonably be argued that they would in fact slow the 
Coalition's victory over Iraq in the field. 
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Colonel Dunlap: Just a quick follow-up. Doesn't an armed force have the right to 
continue to resist as long as it has the means to resist? Or must it make an 
assessment as to whether or not it can be victorious? Isn't it legitimate to try to 
withdraw their forces from the area of combat? In other words, save what they 
could by obscuring the ability of the Coalition forces to identify their movements? 
In fact, during that period they launched an attack against the Marines. They were 
able to marshal their forces to launch an attack against the Marines advancing 
towards Kuwait City under the obscurant occasioned by the fires of the wells. As 
Admiral Stark said, the fouling of the waters posed a very real operational problem 
for Coalition naval forces. Looking at it from the third world's perspective, how 
can we condemn Iraq when we, as an industrialized nation, have these precision 
capabilities only because we have this infrastructure which is dumping pollutants 
into the atmosphere? 
Mr. Harper: As an abstract matter, of course, one could say that a losing force has 
the right to defend itself as long as possible; to conserve its resources as long as it 
may. But it is not simply the United States that has condemned what Iraq did. The 
world community has condemned it. The U.N. has condemned it. I think it is fair 
to say, and I also think of this when trying lawsuits, it may not be important what 
the truth is; truth is what the jury has decided what is true. And, the world jury 
has decided this issue in a way that is absolutely clear. 
Rear Admiral William H. Wright, IV, U.S. Navy: To my way of thinking, if 
Saddam Hussein had done exactly what he had done and the tide had changed and 
he had become the victor, there would be no jury. There would be no follow-up 
punishment. Isn't this essentially an example of "to the victor goes the spoils?" 
And when you, as the winner, want to find an excuse to continue to extract pain 
from the loser, you can do it. 
Mr. Harper: Again, I appreciate the challenge of your comment, but I don't accept 
either the premise or the conclusion that you advance. I think it's important when 
evaluating a conflict that we try to undertake a measure of justice. The same 
arguments that you put forth, of course, had been raised to challenge the war crimes 
trials in Nuremberg and in Tokyo. Ifwe are not prepared to say, as of 1945-46-47, 
that customary international law already condemned aggression; and if we are not 
prepared to say today that customary international law and convention already 
condemns the wanton destruction of the environment; and if we are not prepared 
to apply the first set of principles to the Nazi's and to Tojo, or the second set of 
principles to Iraq today, then we may abandon any hope that any effort we make 
toward advancing the rule oflaw is worth a candle. 
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Professor Leslie C. Green, University of Alberta: I want to follow-up on the 
suggestions that have just been made. If I remember rightly, two things are 
relevant. First, you said, sir, that the world community condemned the Iraqi 
actions as a breach of the law of war. If! remember correctly, the Environmental 
Law and Warfare Conference, !teld in Ottawa about three years ago, didn't 
condemn it. That was a conference of lawyers, not of politicians. As much as I 
respect the Security Council, it is not a body of lawyers. Second, Additional 
Protocol I, which produced the restrictions on damage to the environment, was 
not relevant. It was not in force during the Iraqi operation, and even if it were, I 
think it provides that an offense only occurs if the intention is to affect the 
environment. But, in a general way, can it not be argued that creating a smoke 
screen, setting fire to oil intentionally released into the water to prevent landings 
and that sort of thing, are all justifiable even though you may be losing and your 
purpose is to just cover your retreat? I suggest that it goes a little far to maintain 
automatically that this was clearly a breach of the law of war as it existed at that 
time. 
Mr. Harper: I like the fact that the first three speakers seem to be reading from, 
let us say, conjoined texts. Let me see if I can give yet a third answer. First, the 
fact that lawyers gathered in Ottawa did not see the matter as the Security Council 
and other components of the world community did, is to me, an interesting, but 
not dispositive fact. I do believe the Security Council is a body oflaw though not 
a court and not a group oflawyers as such. But, it is operating within the confines 
of a legal system under the Charter, and therefore, its statements with respect to 
this subject are entitled to a good deal of deference from us, at least to the extent 
of a clear recognition that what Iraq did was beyond the pale. Indeed, none of us 
can cite an example prior to 1991, that would at all be clearly relevant to what Iraq 
had done under the circumstances. 
Second, it seems to me that any person who is fighting any kind of war will want 
to argue that any action taken in regard to defense is justifiable. And to some extent, 
the discussion is rhetorical rather than substantive. There will always be somebody 
around who will make an argument of justification for an action deemed to be 
necessary under the circumstances. But, it is the function of reason under the 
circumstances that I think is decisive here. Ifwe are not prepared to endorse the 
proposition that at some point the befoulment of those waters and the befoulment 
of that air was not legally beyond the pale, then we may as well decide that the 
enterprise in which we're all engaged, which is to bring a system of international 
law to bear on questions of armed conflict, is simply an irrelevant exercise only fit 
for discussion and not for implementation. 
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Vice AdmiralJames H. Doyle, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.): I never had the opportunity 
before to cross-examine the Legal Adviser of the State Department, so I better take 
it. I want to approach it from a little different perspective and get your views. I 
think what you are hearing from Admiral Wright and Colonel Dunlop is the 
dilemma which an operator is faced with when he has to make a decision in those 
shades of gray cases. Since, in this particular case, the standard of widespread, 
severe and long-term is not knowable and you mention that claims cannot even 
be approached or settled at this point, maybe we are asking the wrong question. 
Maybe the question should be more oriented toward military justification. You 
have got to have some standard there and the operator at sea is probably not going 
to get instructions other than "use your own best judgement." It is going to be up 
to him to make a decision, so what are your views on that? 
Mr. Harper: If I understand you correctly, you are inquiring whether military 
justification is the only screen through which we put this question, as opposed to 
considering a competing environmental objective. 
Vice Admiral Doyle: How can we consider the unknown competing 
environmental effects at this point? 
Mr. Harper: I think the situation is that we can consider what is unknowable in 
the sense that we may not know precisely its contours, but we know enough to 
know that it is a catastrophe. It is a little bit like having been hit both by a train 
and by a car and trying to sort out how much damage is attributable to one and 
how much by the other. The fact is that you were damaged and to some degree the 
damage was inextricable. But, you are able to say, in a rough way, that what 
happened was wrong. Well, clearly I think that was the situation here. It is not, to 
a precise extent, known to us to what degree the environment was harmed. But, 
there is no doubt that the harm was substantial. And, if that is the case, foreseeable 
environmental harm is a fair counter to put into the balance test as against military 
justification to see whether or not justification carries the day. 
Professor Michael Bothe, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, 
Germany: Just to assure you, I am not reading from the same paper as the previous 
speakers. Three comments. I was present at the meeting in Ottawa, mentioned by 
Leslie Green. I thought it was not the purpose of that meeting of experts to come 
to any conclusion condemning anything or anybody. If that were the purpose of 
the meeting, it was probably happening at the wrong meeting. But there are certain 
elements in the discussion of the Ottawa meeting which I strongly disliked. This 
was an attitude of benign neglect to what had happened in the field of 
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environmentallaw during the last twenty years or so. In this respect I certainly 
disagree with my good friend Leslie Green. 
The second point pertains to the Security Council. What is the effect of 
Resolution 687? I think it is quite clear that the damage which has to be 
compensated by Iraq under that Resolution is not damage caused by a violation of 
the laws of war, it is damage caused by the fact that Iraq committed an aggression. 
Of course, there is a standard of unlawfulness that is quite different. So the question 
of whether this was widespread, long-lasting and severe, is for that purpose, 
irrelevant. I hope this is clear. I am trying to sell this idea to the U.N. working 
group which is dealing with that matter of which I happen to be a member. My 
question to you, sir, is, were you not pleading with your last remark in a little bit 
of the opposite direction of what you said to begin with. The issue of what are the 
values competing with military advantage which would have to be taken into 
account when a particular decision is made to attack or not to attack, or to attack 
in a particular way. I was most impressed to hear earlier this morning that this was 
a matter considered prior to measures being taken to enforce the U.N. embargo in 
the Adriatic Sea. Now, if we have a rule, which is as general as the principle of 
proportionality, you leave the balancing to the commander. It is the commander 
who is required to balance competing values in the particular case. Could we assist 
the commander by trying to further develop the law in order to make some of those 
issues a little clearer? I agree the principle is there, that the principle is good, but 
there should be a little bit more detail added to that principle in order to make it 
more workable. What you said in your last comment, I think, seems to meditate 
for that approach. Thank you sir. 
Mr. Harper: Well, I hope I have not contradicted mysel£ I had intended to say 
two things. One, that as part of our discussions over the next several days, we are 
going to be factoring in the question of environmental damage as part of the law 
of war calculus. I think I said that earlier and I thought I was repeating it in 
somewhat different words a few minutes ago. 
But, the second point, which is also important and stimulated by your remarks, 
is that our search for details is carried on in a worrisome way. We shall find 
ourselves spinning more wheels without necessarily learning more in the process. 
In that event, I submit it will always be the commander who is going to have to 
make decisions. And, he will not have before him a blueprint that will make it easy 
in very tough cases. There will be principles; there will be laws, if you will, but 
they won't dictate a result in a certain given circumstance. Human judgment will 
have to be brought to bear. My own sense is that over time, cases will illustrate the 
principles that will have already been established. But, I am not persuaded that 
undertaking a further conference to see whether we can elaborate those details now 
would be the best use of our collective energies. 
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Professor Paul C. Szasz: Two comments. One, again, back to the Ottawa 
conference three years ago, I too was a participant. Let me read just one paragraph 
from the chairman's conclusions: "The conference noted that grave damage resulted 
from Iraqi actions during the Gulf War, for example, in setting oil fires and releasing oil 
in the Gulf. There was a shared view that important provisions of custom and conventional 
law had been seriously violated." I think for a basic academic conference, that was a 
strong statement. In effect, the conference condemned the actions the Iraqi's had 
committed as unlawful. 
The other comment, I think, is a slight quibble with what you said before. You 
said that the reason the compensation fund has not yet started operating is because 
ofIraqi non-compliance with Security Council resolutions. I think, actually, the 
reason is that there is a resolution under which Iraq could sell about 1.5 billion 
dollars worth of oil, regardless of compliance with other resolutions, but they 
simply refuse to do so because they do not want money to flow into the 
compensation fund. 
Mr. Harper: I accept your modification and it's quite correct. There is a very 
special resolution for that purpose. 
Professor Szasz: That means that even if they start complying as they hope to 
comply and these actions are lifted, they still may be reluctant to release that 30% 
to the compensation fund. So that is almost a separate problem from the other 
question of compliance. 
Mr. Harper: That is true. Of course, the compensation fund is, in fact, operating. 
But, it cannot make substantial awards because the funds available are so small. 
Let me backup a moment and say that I am beginning to think I was the only 
person in the room who did not attend the Ottawa conference. Second, I waited 
until this time to call on you so you could read the paragraph that, in fact, nailed 
the coffin shut on this subject. But third, I do think that it is very, very important 
to recognize that the final statement did accord with the general thrust of my 
remarks; that the world community did condemn what Iraq had done. 
Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University: As a non-lawyer, I hesitate to put 
words into the mouth of the Legal Adviser and I am sure he will be able to take 
them out again. But it seems that some of those present, especially as reflected in 
the initial questions, may have been making slightly heavy weather, as many 
lawyers have, of the legal issues raised by environmental destruction in the Gulf 
War, by putting so much emphasis on those provisions of Additional Protocol I 
and the ENMOD Convention which you mentioned, that specifically address the 
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environment. And, I took your initial presentation to state something I am going 
to put much more crudely than you did, but thereby to invite your comment on 
it. That is, in order to assess the legality of what Iraq did in the Gulf War, in the 
incidents you have mentioned, you do not need to get to Additional Protocol I or 
the ENMOD Convention at all. The key provisions that were often not mentioned 
in many discussions about the legality of environmental destruction in the Gulf 
War, were those you alluded to in a general way. For example, Article 147 in 1949 
Geneva Convention IV, the grave breaches clause, which mentions wanton 
destruction not justified by military necessity, and various other provisions of 
conventional law going back to the Hague Rules. It seems to me that many people, 
especially at the time when there were such apocalyptic predictions about 
environmental consequences, were lured into discussing the wrong conventions 
because their titles mention the environment. Maybe it is better that they stick to 
old rules and to interpret them because they cover the case better, and because they 
deal with the point that was raised in the question of whether in fact this is wanton 
destruction and despoliation of resources as much of as on the question ofits actual 
subsequent, and in some cases, later incalculable impact upon the environment. 
Mr. Harper: I embrace what you have said with one modification, I would have 
called your remarks elegant rather than crude. Certainly, it is the case that going 
back to Hague 1907 and coming forward, one could find that there was violation 
of long established principles of international law in what Iraq did. 
Professor Bernard H. Oxman, University of Miami: As you know, sir, 
considerable public attention has been paid in the last decade to your job 
description. There was a panel of the American Society ofInternational Law that 
I served on that endeavored to address that issue. I think that, in part, the line of 
argument that you developed depends in large measure on who - and under what 
circumstances - is performing the risk-benefit analyses that are required. Many of 
us have learned from experience that micro-management of military operations 
conducted thousands of miles away can produce undesirable results. The question 
is, it seems to me, who should be involved and at what point, in making decisions 
regarding targeting involving potentially catastrophic environmental damage. 
I guess the question is whether you are satisfied, at least in terms of the 
organization of the United States Government, that an appropriate balance has 
been achieved on this issue. It is, of course, laudable that commanders in the field 
making these decisions, will weigh the factors prudently. But, I think some people 
at least would feel more reassured if they felt, not only in the case of the United 
States, but in the case of other governments as well, that balancing is being done 
at an appropriate policy level, with appropriate input by lawyers who are 
professionally trained to be detached as you had averred to. 
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Mr. Harper: I think the point is an excellent and important one. Certainly, it is 
fair to say, and I can say this in the presence of Jack McNeill, who on many 
occasions not only illustrated for me but instructed me in various matters, that we 
do try hard, at least in this Administration, to involve lawyers at an early stage in 
the matters that we believe have significant legal implications and major policy 
concerns. There is a fairly orderly methodology followed by the Legal Adviser for 
the National Security Council, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of 
Legal Counsel, the General Counsel for the Department of Defense, the General 
Counsel for the CIA, and the State Department's Legal Adviser, for assembling 
from time to time, or ~rough surrogates, to discuss issues that are of that quality. 
I cannot represent to you that we have reached Nirvana on this process. But, I 
think it has worked better and better as we have learned to play together, to use 
the favorite term of an elementary school teacher I very much liked. As we play 
together better, I think the process becomes a better one. 
Professor Christopher Greenwood, Cambridge University: I would like to 
assure the Legal Adviser that I was not at the Ottawa conference either, which may 
go a long way to explaining the clarity of its conclusions. I would like to be 
controversial and say that I agree with the Legal Adviser's view that what Iraq did 
in the Gulfwas a violation of the 1907 Hague Regulations. I do not think there is 
any need or any right to look at Additional Protocol I in this context because it 
clearly was not in force. And, I do not regard those provisions as declaratory of 
customary law. What I do think is important is that the reason why Iraq was clearly 
in violation is that the motive and the purpose that Iraq had was largely vindictive. 
Particularly in relation to the firing of the oil wells, it was an act of destruction 
designed to shock the world. Any military advantage that might have arisen was 
largely incidental. I am quite sure it was incidental in the minds of the Iraqi high 
command when they took the decision to do what they did. But, if we look at this 
as a precedent for the future, I think it would be a great mistake to be locked into 
the mind-set of thinking that the act of releasing a million tons of oil is necessarily 
a violation of the laws of war. I do not think that is necessarily the case at all. If 
Kuwait had released that oil into the Gulf as part of a desperate defensive measure 
to stop Iraqi amphibious operations in the original invasion, then I think we would 
come to a very different conclusion, applying the law that was in force at the time. 
Mr. Harper: I can only add, it is great to hear that someone agrees with me. More 
to the point, I accept the counter-example, which is one of the reasons why the 
issue of getting into details as suggested by another speaker is extremely hazardous. 
We do not know what the future will present. We can be confident that it will not 
present easy cases and, therefore, we cannot escape that most tragic and yet, in a 
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real sense, that most important aspect of human life; that is to say, the application 
of our judgments to the facts at the time. 
Professor George K. Walker, Wake Forest University: One quick question and 
comment. That is, we have to keep in mind the mirror image principle in all this. 
And that is, we cannot just simply look back and say the law of armed conflict is 
of a prior era; that we have to consider the possibility that there is law developing 
and developing even now. Is that your position? 
Mr. Harper: Absolutely, the law is not only alive; it now and then kicks. We have 
to know that it is not a dead science. It is a lively art and we must bring to it a sense 
that it will increase in our lifetime and for generations to come. 
Professor Grunawalt: We have run out of time. I want to thank the Honorable 
Mr. Harper. It's obvious, from the discussion we have just had, that his was a 
superb keynote address. And, I think it is now clear that we have many things to 
do this week and I thank each one of you who have raised issues and discussions. 
We have just begun to see the tip of the iceberg, a quick glimpse of the issues that 
we will be hearing from our panelists. And, I know that we will get into 
considerable debate and discussion on these topics. Mr. Harper, one more time, 
thank you so much for providing the tone, the necessity of this debate, and the 
intellectual content of your address. Thank you very much. 
